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Book Review
Wandering Lonely as a Cloud: National Citizenship and
the Case for Non-Territorial Election Districts
JAMES A. GARDNER
Andrew Rehfeld. The Concept of Constituency:
Political Representation, Democratic Legitimacy,
and Institutional Design. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005, 244 pp., $75.00 (hardcover).

I

I

1812, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry, a staunch Republican, signed
into law apportionment legislation designed to
ensure Republican control over the state senate
in the next election. To achieve this goal, the
legislation divided Essex County into two senatorial election districts, and reallocated the
town of Chelsea, located just over the border
in neighboring Suffolk County, from its former
Suffolk County senatorial district to one of the
new Essex County districts. The manifest purpose of this legislation was to carve out of Essex County, which in 1811 had comprised a single, solidly Federalist senatorial district, a new
district that would elect several Republican
state senators. Within weeks the legislation became the object of intense public scorn and outrage, giving rise to a new political term of derision: “gerrymandering.”1
Two hundred years later, the process by
which election district lines are drawn still is
heaped in public scorn. It is widely condemned as excessively and irremediably parN EARLY

tisan. It is blamed for producing a host of uncompetitive and even entirely uncontested
elections throughout the nation. Widespread
partisan redistricting is said to have created
a Congress so bitterly divided by ideology
and partisanship as to be incapable of acting
in the public good, if indeed it is capable of
acting at all. Redistricting practices are excoriated from the left as a tool for suppressing
minority political power, from the right for
being subjected to manipulation on racial
grounds, and from the center for elevating
racial symbolism over the substance of minority political claims. Criticizing the shape
of electoral districts has become something of
a political sport, in which participants compete to supply vividly pejorative adjectives,
such as “bizarre,” “contorted,” “grotesque,”
“irregular,” and “serpentine,” and descriptive metaphors, such as “bacon strip,”
“dumbbell,” “jigsaw,” and “pseudopod.”
Critics have proposed numerous reforms to
improve the redistricting process and control
its susceptibility to partisan manipulation.
Some would impose substantive requirements
to constrain the discretion of redistricters: districts must meet mathematical standards of
compactness, for example, or must circumscribe objectively identifiable communities of

1

James A. Gardner is Joseph W. Belluck and Laura L.
Aswad Professor of Civil Justice at the State University of
New York, University at Buffalo Law School.

Elmer C. Griffith, The Rise and Development of the Gerrymander (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company,
1907), 19–20, 64–74; George Athan Billias, Elbridge Gerry:
Founding Father and Republican Statesman (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1976), 316–18.
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interest, or must be politically competitive as
measured by major party registration and voting patterns. Others would rely on procedural
reforms, such as specifying mandatory linedrawing algorithms, or vesting the power to redistrict in nonpartisan, independent commissions.
Meaningful reform, however, has been elusive. State legislators, not surprisingly, have
been slow to adopt reforms that would deprive
them of the power to protect themselves and
their parties from effective electoral competition. The public, although apparently disgusted by redistricting practices, seems confused about what, if anything to do; reforms
have been imposed on the legislature by initiative in some states, such as Arizona, but have
been defeated in others, such as California and
Ohio. Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court has
twice attempted to articulate constitutional
limits to partisan gerrymandering, and failed
spectacularly on both occasions.2 The Court recently accepted a case from Texas that it may
use as a vehicle for taking yet another pass at
this seemingly intractable problem.3
It is often argued in academic circles that the
main reason why the seemingly simple task of
drawing election district lines has proven so
troublesome is that the baseline is uncertain
and contested—we lack, in other words, any
universally accepted standards by which to decide what the proper boundaries of a territorial election district ought to be. Should the line
be here or there? Should the district stop at this
river or mountain range, or span it? Should it
include this neighborhood or that? This block?
This apartment complex or shopping mall?
These are not questions that admit of obvious
answers. As Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in
a recent case, “there are yet no agreed upon
substantive principles of fairness in districting,” and consequently “we have no basis on
which to define clear, manageable, and politically neutral standards for measuring the particular burden a given [districting plan] imposes on representational rights.”4
This was not always the case. Throughout
much of American history, the proper boundaries of state and federal election districts were
generally understood to coincide with the
boundaries of the primary units of local gov-
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ernance—counties in most of the nation, towns
in New England. What was shocking about the
eponymous 1812 gerrymander was not so
much that politicians manipulated the structure of representation for partisan purposes—
such practices were already known in England
and colonial America5—but that it conspicuously flouted a core tenet of the age holding
that county boundaries demarcated genuine
differences among populations, and that these
differences were meaningful for purposes of
legislative representation. Yet even this seemingly firm baseline was never as solid as it appeared, for it simply referred any uncertainty
about the proper boundaries of election districts to the prior question of the proper boundaries of counties and towns, a question for
which no universally accepted standards existed even then. As a result, nineteenth-century
state legislatures sometimes manipulated representation more subtly by adhering faithfully
to local government lines, but simply creating
new counties and towns, which under existing
constitutional rules were then entitled to independent representation.6
What little consensus as existed about the
proper dimensions of election districts began
to erode during the first half of the twentieth
century in response to growing population disparities between urban and rural districts that
became increasingly difficult to ignore. The
coup de grâce was delivered by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1964 when it decided in Wesberry v. Sanders7 and Reynolds v. Sims8 that population disparities among election districts violated the federal Constitution. Those decisions
ushered in the present era, in which population
equality has become the dominant constitutional criterion by which the validity of districts
is judged; in which district lines must be dis-

2

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
3 League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 74
U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2005) (noting probable jurisdiction in four consolidated appeals).
4 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307–08.
5 Griffith, supra note 1, at 23–29.
6 See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 1, at 73, 102.
7 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
8 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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carded and remade every decade; and in which
no line or boundary whatsoever can lay claim
to any greater intrinsic validity or permanence
than any other. When it comes to dividing up
territory into election districts, we are, truly, at
sea.
In his new book The Concept of Constituency,
Andrew Rehfeld, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Washington University, offers
an explanation for why, in the forty years since
Wesberry, no consensus has emerged concerning the standards for evaluating the propriety
and constitutional validity of congressional
election district boundaries (his argument is
confined to congressional districts; he makes
no corresponding claims about state and local
legislative districts). According to Rehfeld, the
reason is that the proper baseline against which
congressional election districts should be evaluated is not territorial at all. Our problems with
evaluating and justifying district lines arise not
because we have failed to crack the code for
crafting fair and valid territorial districts, but
more fundamentally because congressional
districts simply should not, as a matter of political theory, be territorially defined. In taking
this position, Rehfeld does not argue that the
project of drawing territorial elections districts
is inherently incoherent; there are reasons, he
explains, why using territory as a basis for legislative representation might be desirable. He
argues, instead, that the main problem plaguing the redistricting enterprise is that the use
of territorial districts has not been properly justified for what it is: a potentially excusable deviation from a proper, non-territorial ideal.
A similar message about the futility and inappropriateness of territorial districting has
been delivered before, by advocates of proportional representation (PR). They argue that PR,
instead of requiring voters to submit to sorting,
permits them instead to sort themselves voluntarily—by partisanship, ideology, race, class,
ethnicity, age, and so on—in ways that vary
with the contingent political salience of the issues of the day.9 But although Rehfeld agrees
that large-scale territorial districts for national
legislative offices are improper, PR, he contends, is not a satisfactory alternative; indeed,
he rejects it for the very characteristics that PR
supporters typically commend: it results in
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constituencies that are homogeneous and voluntary, qualities that Rehfeld views as undesirable in an electoral constituency.
In The Concept of Constituency, Rehfeld offers a
third way. Representatives in Congress, he argues, should be elected neither from singlemember, territorial election districts nor from
multimember PR districts. Instead, he maintains,
the ideal structure of congressional representation requires representatives to be elected from
randomized, permanent, involuntary, non-territorial, nationwide, single-member election districts. This method of districting, he claims, and
this alone, furnishes the baseline against which
any other form of districting must be evaluated.
In the current climate of complete and utter
confusion, even despair, concerning the direction of redistricting practices, Rehfeld’s project
is important, laudable, and most welcome. His
book is a much-needed attempt to develop a
stock of concepts and a vocabulary sufficient to
permit reasoned argument and justification in
subdividing an electorate into constituencies,
and he shows us both by argument and by example how to demand sound justifications for
any use of territory as the basis for election districts. More specifically, Rehfeld situates the
modern practice of democratic representation
within an ancient philosophical debate: how
should political institutions be structured so as
best to promote the common good? In so doing, he simultaneously plants himself firmly
within the rich, new discipline of institutional
analysis that cuts across all branches of contemporary social science. The book is written
with exceptional clarity, engagingly advances
a rich argument, and performs a valuable service by challenging us to pay careful attention
to positions and arguments that, as Rehfeld
persuasively shows, have not been subjected to
adequate scrutiny.
II
The book opens with a brief tour of the conceptual landscape. Territorial districting, Reh9

Perhaps the most cogent recent statement of this position appears in Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy
(New York: Free Press, 1994).
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feld argues, is by no means inevitable, as many
Americans seem to suppose; it is best conceived
as only one of many possible ways in which an
electorate might be organized into constituencies. The categorization of citizens by place of
residence, rather than by some other criterion
such as class or ethnicity, is therefore something that must be justified rather than assumed. Rehfeld reviews ten possible justifications, culled from the democratic literature, for
territorial districting. These range from the empirical, such as the claim that meaningfully distinct “communities of interest are normally
based on residency patterns” (p. 49), to the theoretical, such as Nancy Schwartz’s argument
that face-to-face interaction in a territorial election district is necessary to the development of
good citizens (p. 50).
One of Rehfeld’s purposes in reviewing these
arguments is to link the ways in which politics
is practiced to the modes of its institutionalization, an approach that lays bare the contingencies of present political life. For example,
Rehfeld’s focus on the institutions of politics allows him to mount a vigorous attack on the old
saw that “all politics is local.” “The localness of
politics,” he argues, is “epiphenomenal, nothing more than a byproduct of territorial electoral constituencies. If electoral constituencies
were defined by profession . . . all politics
would be ‘vocational’ ” (p. 8). Congressional
porkbarrel politics thus focuses on the local—
roads and bridges, community centers and
playgrounds—only and contingently because
electoral constituencies are local, thereby furnishing representatives with incentives to deliver to their constituents benefits in a form that
can be enjoyed through physical proximity
rather than in other ways (pp. 21, 152).
After laying out the conceptual framework,
the book moves on to a historical account that
attempts to explain how we have arrived at a
point where territorial congressional districting
is almost universally thought to be the only
proper method by which to construct federal
legislative constituencies. Rehfeld begins with
a concise rehearsal of the history of territorial
political constituencies from medieval through
colonial times, arguing that territorial representation in those days served a clearly legitimate purpose because localities did in fact com-
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prise distinct communities of interest. People
lived differently then; “it was by local communities that individuals primarily organized
their lives” (p. 69).
Because of its unprecedented size, however,
the United States from the beginning raised
problems for this long-standing conception of
legislative representation. Unless the national
legislature were to contain an unwieldy multitude of representatives, congressional election
districts would have to be so large that they
could not possibly demarcate distinct communities of interest constituted by face-to-face interaction among people who lived and worked
together; inevitably, they would contain instead large groups of people who were social,
economic, and political strangers to one another. As a result, the practice of territorial districting for an American national legislature
would require new justifications, and Rehfeld
devotes a good bit of space to scouring the historical record for any such justifications offered
by the founding generation.
Along the way, Rehfeld usefully pries apart
justifications for national political institutions
from those offered to support state and local
ones, and he makes a nice argument that the
Framers expected citizens to form attachments
to the national government not through any set
of institutional arrangements, but by giving
their allegiance voluntarily, on the basis of
good performance (pp. 92–95). National political institutions thus were aimed at ensuring the
competence of the federal government on the
merits rather than at constructing a national
identity directly by, say, channeling citizens
into shared social and political contact. Consequently, any attachments of citizens to the national government, if they emerged at all,
would be rational rather than sentimental, an
entirely different basis from that which undergirded Americans’ attachments to their state
and local governments (pp. 91–92).
The final portion and analytic heart of the
book lays out Rehfeld’s normative defense of
randomized, permanent, nationwide congressional districts as an ideal from which all deviations must be justified, a position he derives
from a wide-ranging analysis of theories of
democracy, representation, and democratic deliberation. His basic project is Madisonian: like
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Madison, he begins from the assumption that
citizens may at times behave self-interestedly,
and he therefore takes as his goal the design of
institutions capable of simulating the actions
that a virtuous citizenry might take, if one existed. Ultimately, he hopes to show how we
might construct a national legislature best able
to pursue the common good of all (p. 212).

III
Nearly a third of the book is devoted to examining the historical evolution of justifications for territorial districting practices, and
the bulk of this account consists of a sustained
derivation of the justifications for territorial national election districts that may have motivated the founding generation. Because Rehfeld in the end discounts the historical
analysis as inconclusive and ultimately unhelpful, and because the book’s main project is
one of political theory, I shall focus in this essay primarily on its theoretical derivation of
baseline norms for congressional districting.
Nevertheless, two aspects of the historical account deserve brief mention, both relating to
consequences arising from the book’s methodology of historical inquiry.
At the outset of his examination of the
thought of the Framers and ratifiers, Rehfeld
forthrightly acknowledges that “[a]t the founding of the United States, territorial electoral
constituencies were an institutional habit of
mind so ingrained in thought and practice that
almost no argument about them appears in the
literature” (p. 81). He might have done well
simply to pack up shop there, for in an effort
to squeeze more juice out of a silent, or at least
very quiet, historical record, he employs a
highly questionable method of inquiry that involves developing, apparently from first philosophical principles, “a list of plausible justifications” (p. 58) for territorial congressional
districting, and then scanning the historical
record for signs of their consistency with “normative positions or empirical expectations that
were widely held on all sides of the founding
debates” (p. 58).
This is quite clearly a mode of analysis that,
at best, greatly risks overestimating the degree

to which the practices under investigation were
self-consciously justified at all by those who
employed them; at worst, it risks reading into
the record an account that has its source in the
investigator’s contemporary measuring tool
rather than in the actual record. That Rehfeld
has fallen into his own methodological trap is
suggested by his discovery in the thought of
the founding generation of what looks suspiciously like a contemporary theory of deliberative democracy. Of course, he is far from the
first to do so; many neo-civic republicans and
deliberative democrats have claimed Madison
as a forebear, a claim that has always seemed
to me to ring hollow given the founding generation’s objective epistemology of morals and
their embrace of natural law, belief systems in
which deliberation offers little of value even to
elites, and nothing at all to ordinary citizens
who by definition lack the education and
leisure necessary to engage in eighteenth-century-style right reason.
A second difficulty with Rehfeld’s historical
analysis is that, in confining himself to scanning the historical record for evidence that fits
his list of theoretically plausible justifications, he
risks overlooking some justifications for territorial districting that may have rested on less
lofty principles. One possibility that sneaks beneath Rehfeld’s radar, perhaps in part because
he makes an odd, but deliberate, decision to ignore the role of federalism in the Framers’
thinking about electoral structures and institutions (pp. 66–67), concerns the territorial subdivision of states for purposes of governmental administration. As mentioned earlier, until
the mid-twentieth century it was widely accepted that state and federal legislative districts
ought, for all but the most densely populated
regions, to lie along county lines. This was no
coincidence: counties played an exceedingly
important role in the political and administrative life of the states. Consider this 1884 account
by the North Carolina Supreme Court:
The counties of this state, like those of
most of the states in the Union, are subdivisions of its territory embracing the
people who inhabit the same, created by
the sovereign authority, and organized for
political and civil purposes. . . . The lead-
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ing and principal purpose in establishing
them is, to effectuate the political organization and civil administration of the
state, in respect to its general purposes
and policy which require local direction,
supervision and control, such as matters
of local finance, education, provisions for
the poor, the establishment and maintenance of highways and bridges, and in
large measure, the administration of public justice. It is through them, mainly, that
the powers of government reach and operate directly upon the people, and the
people direct and control the government.
They are indeed a necessary part and parcel of the subordinate instrumentalities
employed in carrying out the general policy of the state in the administration of
government. . . . [Their] functions are not
always the same; . . . but, generally, they
are intended only to be essential aids and
political agencies in the administration of
the government of the state, and exercise
their powers for that purpose.10
If counties serve mainly as the administrative
arms of the state—if they are the primary vehicles by which state power is transmitted
downward to the populace—it might well have
seemed logical and efficient to make use of
these existing conduits to transmit power in the
other direction: upward from the people to
their government through an electoral system
organized along the same administrative matrix.
Granted, this explanation has somewhat less
force for congressional districts than for state
legislative districts, first because states generally elected far fewer congressional representatives than they had counties, meaning that
pre-Wesberry federal election districts typically
comprised groupings of counties rather than
individual counties; and second, because counties typically played no role, or at most a minimal and contingent role, in the downward
transmission of national power to the general
citizenry. Even so, it may well have been easier for states to administer a congressional election from districts comprised of several adjacent counties than to administer one from a
district of comparable population that did not
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fall along existing county lines. Moreover, the
fact that counties played no formal role as a
conduit of national power is not inconsistent
with their use as administrative organizing
structures in federal elections because, under
the peculiar compromise structure of the U.S.
Constitution, states—not the federal government—are given primary responsibility for the
administration of federal elections.11
IV
Rehfeld ultimately concludes, very plausibly, that the historical justifications for territorial districting are simply not useful for evaluating the practice as it exists today, and he
therefore turns in the final portion of the book
to what is obviously his main ambition in writing it: to identify from principles of political
theory and institutional design the best method
for dividing a national citizenry into legislative
electoral constituencies, and to evaluate the use
of territorial districting against this baseline
ideal. The analysis here is rich and wide-ranging, and offers the reader much rewarding food
for thought. Yet this is in some ways the least
satisfying part of the book, mainly because the
analysis, for all its erudition, is deeply shaped
by an unexplored and unjustified (though not
necessarily unjustifiable) set of closely related
assumptions about the nature of the common
good of a national community; the ideal form
and subjects of national politics; the best kind
of representation in a national legislature; the
proper division of power between national and
subnational governments; and, ultimately and
most importantly, the ontology of national citizenship itself. I wish to probe these assumptions, rather than Rehfeld’s analytic superstructure, in the balance of this essay.
10

White v. Commissioners of Chowan County, 90 N.C.
437, 438 (1884).
11 U.S. Const. art. I, § 4 provides: “The Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations . . . ”; art. II, § 1 provides:
“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to
the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress. . . . ”
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Rehfeld’s guiding goal in undertaking a normative analysis of national legislative districting practices is, insofar as possible, to provide
through principles of institutional design a
blueprint for constructing a Congress that is
best able and most motivated to pursue the
common good of the national citizenry. As a
designer, he begins from the premise that neither citizens nor their representatives can be
relied upon to behave at all times in the most
desirable ways, and his approach is thus
Madisonian in that he aims to create an institutional structure that will simulate the process
by which a virtuous citizenry might elect a virtuous Congress (p. 212). The heart of the analysis consists of a defense of the proposition that
the ideal electoral sub-constituency should possess three characteristics: it should be stable,
involuntary, and, most important of all, heterogeneous. From this set of premises, it follows readily that neither territorial districting
nor PR is satisfactory—territorial districting because it divides voters into groups that are insufficiently stable, excessively voluntary, and
relatively homogeneous; and PR because it creates constituencies that are completely unstable, totally voluntary, and almost entirely homogeneous.
Stability in a constituency’s population is required, Rehfeld argues, by rudimentary principles of democratic authorization and accountability. Meaningful self-rule requires that
elected officials be electorally accountable to
those who installed them, and to no others:
“The reason a representative is accountable to
this group (rather than that one) is that she was
authorized by this group (and not that one) to
act” (p. 188). True accountability therefore requires that the membership of a constituency
remain as stable as possible between elections;
ideally, it should not vary at all, not even by
the amount associated with routine in- and outmigration from present territorial congressional districts, and certainly not by the amount
typically associated with the decennial redistricting process.
The book’s argument against voluntary constituency formation is couched mostly as a response to arguments in its favor advanced by
advocates of PR, and so need not detain us
here. Far more important to the book’s analy-
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sis is the claim that electoral sub-constituencies
should be heterogeneous rather than homogeneous: “only constituencies that look like the
nation they collectively represent would provide the right kind of incentives or otherwise
enhance a representative’s ability to act toward
the public good” (p. 204). This claim, Rehfeld
argues, holds regardless of whether representatives behave, consistent with pluralist models of politics, as advocates for the particular
interests of their constituents or, consistent
with republican models, as public-regarding
seekers of the common good. In the former
case, “when a representative advocated for the
good of his constituency he would, by definition, be advocating for the good of the whole”
(p. 204). At the same time, a representative proceeding in the republican mode “would face
the right kinds of electoral incentives . . . to deliberate freely about the public good” because
the representative would be accountable to
“the very collective toward whose good he purportedly aims” (p. 204).
From here, it is a short step to the conclusion
that election districts should be populated by
random assignment because that is the only
method by which to ensure true and equal heterogeneity among districts. Preserving the necessary heterogeneity, furthermore, means that
district assignments must be involuntary and
permanent. And unless we are also willing to
force the members of these heterogeneous districts to live in assigned places, something Rehfeld views as unnecessary given the capabilities of modern communications (to say nothing
of its normative undesirability), it is clear that
the ideal, randomized electoral district must be
nonterritorial. In the end, then, Rehfeld finds
himself occupying a satisfyingly contrarian position: “rather than assume that representation
is always about the representation of subnational groups . . . , I assume the presumption is
instead that we can represent the whole, and
indeed it is deviations from representation of
the whole that must be justified” (p. 212).
Rehfeld is well aware of some of the likely
consequences of a system of randomized, nonterritorial districting for the composition and
activity of congressional representatives. Because districts would have nearly identical ideological profiles, each district would elect very
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similar kinds of representatives, who would
differ very little from one another ideologically,
and who would therefore have little need to deliberate in Congress about public policy. As a
result, in such a system the will of a national
majority would be transformed quite directly
into policy.
While some might view various aspects of
such a system with concern, Rehfeld believes
its advantages would well outweigh any disadvantages, at least as an abstract ideal. When
each electoral constituency is, in John Adams’s
words, “an exact portrait in miniature, of the
people at large,” representatives can get elected
only on platforms that appeal to the common
good of the whole people (pp. 204–5). The resultant homogeneity of the legislature would
produce a convergence of party positions (pp.
226–27), which “could give rise to the formation of a kind of non-partisan, professional legislator less electable under the current, highly
partisan electoral system” (p. 227). A decline in
the breadth of deliberation within the legislature would be offset by an increase in deliberation within constituencies on account of their
greater diversity (p. 235). And denying the majority control over legislative policy, which it
should ideally have under any reasonable theory of democracy (pp. 206, 231), is not the way
to protect against majority tyranny. Instead of
manipulating the electoral system to compensate for injustice, Rehfeld argues, we should address injustice directly, on the merits (p. 232).
Finally, if racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in
the legislature is deemed absolutely essential,
the way to get it is not by manipulating constituencies so that they elect representatives
with the desired characteristics, but by frankly
and straightforwardly using a quota system for
candidates to get the right final mix in the legislature (pp. 237–39).
It must be stressed that Rehfeld does not argue that the system he describes ought actually
to be implemented in this or any other existing
polity; rather, he argues for it as a defeasible
baseline ideal, any deviations from which must
be appropriately justified. The book does not
explore in any depth the conditions under
which deviations from the ideal—including the
use of PR or territorial districts—might be justified, but it does suggest that deviations might
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be allowable in at least two kinds of circumstances. First, large territorial districts might be
appropriate where territory corresponds much
more closely to interest than it does in the contemporary United States. Rehfeld explicitly approves of territorial constituencies for local
governments, “whose proper function is limited to local resource allocations” (p. 158); presumably, he would say the same for national
political structures where territory and interest
coincide on an appropriately gross scale, a
situation that might arise in, say, a highly decentralized, aggregative confederation. Territorially based representation might also be justifiable for systems in which non-proportionate
representation of territorially organized groups
is a fundamental term of the basic social contract, as in ethnic consociationalism.

V
Is, then, the randomized, nonterritorial congressional election district a plausible ideal?
Perhaps, but before we accept Rehfeld’s argument, we ought to attend to some of the unarticulated assumptions that underwrite his
analysis. These assumptions are neither trivial
nor uncontroversial; they concern some of the
most fundamental institutions and practices of
representative democracy, and strongly influence the shape of the book’s normative argument. Bringing such assumptions to a work of
political theory is, of course, unavoidable. Ideally, however, a work of political theory ought
at least to bring these assumptions into the
open, where readers may evaluate them. My
purpose here, then, is simply to flush out and
scrutinize some of these assumptions.
A good place to start is with Rehfeld’s underlying conception of the ideal form of national politics. It is to be expected in a democracy that on many or most issues citizens will
hold a wide variety of views, and that many of
these views will conflict. Every democratic system of governance therefore faces the fundamental question of how to reduce a multiplicity of citizen views to a single policy outcome
or set of outcomes, and one of the main distinctions between forms of democracy concerns
where within the system the necessary conflict
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resolution is to occur. Rehfeld’s argument for
randomized election districts presupposes that
the best and proper locus for the resolution of
political conflict is in the electorate rather than
in the legislature. This might certainly be true,
but it is a presupposition that seems to require
some defense.
To see Rehfeld’s position on this issue, it is
useful to contrast the proposal he advances in
The Concept of Constituency to a very different
proposal, made in a similar spirit, by Robert
Weissberg in a well-known 1978 article.12 In
that piece, Weissberg argued that there is no
reason why a legislature must be understood
as a collection of representatives of individual
constituencies, and that an alternative and
equally appealing view is to conceive of a legislature as representing a people in its collectivity. In that case, the best way to assemble a
legislature truly representative of its people
would be not through election of individual
legislators by sub-constituencies, but by random selection of the entire body. Citizens
would, of course, sacrifice direct electoral control over the legislature, but a legislature in
which all segments of society were accurately
represented might conceivably implement the
people’s will even better than one assembled
through direct electoral appointment.
Rehfeld’s and Weissberg’s proposals stand,
then, at opposite poles of a spectrum of idealized democratic institutions: for Rehfeld, constituencies should be randomized, resulting in
a perfectly homogeneous legislature; for Weissberg, legislators should be randomized, resulting in a perfectly heterogeneous legislature. Yet
for all their differences, the most significant distinction between these two proposals concerns
where within the system conflict resolution will
occur. In Rehfeld’s system, all conflict resolution occurs within the electorate and none
within the legislature; in Weissberg’s system,
all conflict resolution occurs within the legislature and none within the electorate. Both systems should, all other things being equal, produce similar policy outcomes somewhere in the
vicinity of the preferences of the median voter,
so how might we choose between them?
The difficulty, of course, is that all other
things are rarely equal, and much therefore
turns on a comparison of the institutional set-
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tings in which the necessary conflict resolution
is expected to take place. With the problem thus
framed, it is easy to tick off a host of reasons
why we might prefer policy debate and conflict resolution to occur in the legislature rather
than in the electorate. For example, allocating
conflict resolution to the legislature effectuates
a potentially desirable division of labor between citizens and representatives, an arrangement that recent research suggests voters
strongly prefer to active individual engagement.13 It is also possible, and perhaps even
likely, that deliberation will be of higher quality when it occurs among legislators than when
it occurs among citizens. Power differentials
among deliberators are likely to be fewer and
less severe in a legislature than among ordinary
citizens, and legislative deliberation can be regulated by procedural rules of fairness in ways
that are unavailable to guide the course of
spontaneous deliberation among voters. Policy
debates by legislatures are also likely to be
more transparent than similar debates occurring in the electorate. An exchange within the
legislature invoking a more diverse set of viewpoints in the context of a wider-ranging debate
might provide a better education for the public than a similar debate occurring privately
among citizens, and might lead to broader public exposure to minority views. And so on.
The point here is not that Rehfeld’s analysis
wrongly shunts conflict resolution out of the
legislature and into the electorate. There might
be good reasons for doing so. The point is,
rather, that Rehfeld assumes that a system allocating conflict resolution to heterogeneous
electoral constituencies is ideal, but never offers any reasons to think that it is better on this
score than the alternatives he criticizes.
An even more significant tacit assumption
that shapes the analysis is Rehfeld’s conception
of the national common good. At the outset, it
is worth noting that Rehfeld offers no evidence,
nor even any argument, that territorial dis-

12

Robert Weissberg, Collective vs. Dyadic Representation
in Congress, 72 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 535 (1978).
13 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth
Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs about How Government
Should Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002).
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tricting by itself presently works against the
common good. He does not argue, for example, that territorial districting has resulted in
the enactment of specific, identifiable pieces of
federal legislation that are destructive of the
common good; or that run-of-the-mill legislation coming out of Congress is normatively bad
(whether or not this can be attributed to territorial districting); or that any such problems
could be cured by a change in the representational basis of the House without also altering
constitutional bicameralism (he proposes no reform to the Senate).
Rehfeld does, however, have something to
say about porkbarrel politics—certainly a
species of legislation that might be thought inconsistent with the common good—and argues, as indicated above, that political pork
tends to be local only because congressional
districts are territorial. On the other hand, he
clearly believes that porkbarrel politics would
not cease if the basis of districting were
changed; only the form in which pork is delivered would change along with the basis of districting (pp. 152, 222). The nub of his argument
seems to be that any impulse representatives
feel to return favors to their districts will be
channeled by a structure of randomized, nonterritorial districts into a form that by definition serves the common good.
What kind of pork or other benefits would
representatives elected from such districts bring
back in order to earn credit from their constituents for serving district interests? Presumably, it will tend to be legislation or spending
that most directly benefits the district’s
median voter, as such benefits will earn representatives the biggest bang for the buck. But
since randomization will produce a system in
which the median voter in each district has the
same preferences as the median voter nationwide, legislation that benefits the district’s median voter necessarily conduces not just to the
good of the people of the district, but to the good
of all, nationwide. Rehfeld’s proposed districts
thus are structured so as to strip away incentives
for Congress to consider issues linked to localities and specific interest groups; the idea seems
to be that this will elevate congressional concerns by limiting Congress to dealing with issues of very broad concern—national issues.
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This view of the matter is certainly coherent
and plausible, but it rests firmly on two important and contestable assumptions about the
common good of a nation. Specifically, it assumes that a national legislature (as opposed
to other institutions) best serves the common
good when it (a) deals solely with issues of concern to national majorities, and (b) takes positions on such issues in accord with the preferences of national majorities. Neither one of
these propositions is so self-evidently true that
it can be accepted without some defense.
First, it is at least possible that the good of a
nation is linked to the good of its parts in such
a way as to make national concern with and
satisfaction of local or other minoritarian needs
a valid way of promoting the good of all.
Would the rebuilding of New Orleans after its
destruction by Hurricane Katrina, for example,
conduce to the national good or only to the local or regional good? Rehfeld acknowledges
the difficulties raised by such questions, but
contends that his system presupposes no particular conception of the national good (pp.
229–30), and would therefore be neutral on
such matters. If a national majority thinks that
the good of the nation would be promoted in
the long run by actions that conduce most immediately to the good of some special or local
interest, he argues, then it is appropriate for
Congress to take up such issues, and it will
have the proper incentives to do so (pp.
233–34).
I am not sure that this response is entirely
satisfactory. Although it is true that a system
of randomized, nonterritorial districts would
be consistent with both tightly nationalized
and loosely decentralized conceptions of the
national interest, such a system is not designed
to respond to different conceptions of the national good; it is designed to respond to the beliefs of a national majority concerning the meaning of the national good. The more pertinent
question, then, is this: do we have any reason
to expect a national majority of voters to be
equally open to arguments that spending federal money to rebuild New Orleans is or is not
conducive to the common good? I’m not sure
we do. The vast majority of voters in every nonterritorial electoral district will live far from
New Orleans, will never have visited New Or-
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leans, and will never have derived any benefit,
so far as they can imagine, from New Orleans.
Citizens may be grouped in nonterritorial districts, but they are still situated locally. It would
take an unusual act of collective transcendence
of individual situatedness, it seems to me, for
a majority of voters in a majority of districts to
embrace the proposition that using national resources to deliver benefits that in the short term
are tightly focused and localized would be in
the interest of all. I shall return to this point
shortly.
Rehfeld’s second unstated, and controversial, assumption about the common good,
closely related to the first, is that the national
good is by definition furthered by satisfaction
of the preferences of the median voter—the result his districting system is designed to bring
about. This is certainly true on a Downsian
model of politics, but it is clearly false on a civic
republican model, a model that requires representatives to use their independent judgment
and to deliberate with one another to determine
the content of the common good. This problem
is exacerbated by the fact that Rehfeld’s ideal
system is one in which very little deliberation
is likely to occur in the House because all representatives will have very similar views—in
fact, they will have views corresponding to
those of the national median voter. Here, then,
the book seems, notwithstanding the author’s
disclaimers (e.g., p. 229), to tilt decisively toward a substantive conception of the common
good.
There is, however, another situation in which
Rehfeld’s proposal for randomized, nonterritorial districts clearly would direct congressional
attention toward the common good of all: if all
citizens are substantially homogeneous in their
political preferences, or if they are at least capable of behaving as though they were homogeneous by ignoring aspects of their localness
and individuality, and by concentrating, when
they elect congressional representatives, solely
on issues properly of concern to the entire nation. This observation leads me to raise one final concern about the book’s underlying assumptions, a concern based less on any single
piece of evidence than on a feeling gathered impressionistically after spending considerable
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time with the book. My concern is this: that
Rehfeld rests his argument, at some ultimate
level, on an unarticulated ontology of national
citizenship that abstracts citizens in their national capacity from their civic situatedness as
citizens of, and actors in and upon, state and
local polities. There is a sense, that is to say, in
which Rehfeld seems to think that Americans,
qua Americans, are in some sense “really” or
“naturally” cosmopolitan citizens of the nation,
and that reforms are needed to liberate them
from institutional structures that inappropriately force them, against their true and better
judgment, to gaze at their toes when their natural tendency is to gaze upward, toward the
horizon, if not indeed toward the heavens of
national communion.
Now this is in many ways an attractive image, but as an ideal it is far from neutral; it rests
on very clear and specific assumptions about
how human beings behave and interact politically. Our own political tradition, it seems to
me, looks at things very differently. With its division of power among territorially defined
states and localities; a federal structure that creates a perpetual power struggle between territorial states and an all-encompassing nation; a
national Senate in which the interests of territorial states are permanently represented; and
a long tradition of territorial districting in the
House,14 the American political framework
seems to rest upon a conception of the common
good and of national politics according to
which the best way to promote the good of all
is for the institutions of national governance to
serve to a considerable extent as forums for the
resolution of competing claims about the ad-
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The territoriality of representation in the House is no
less entrenched than it is in the Senate: under Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers” (emphasis
added). Thus, even if Congress repealed the Apportionment Act and permitted states to elect congressional delegations at large, which was the case prior to 1842, House
members would still represent territory to some irreducible degree. States could still use nonterritorial districting (or PR, for that matter) to elect their congressional
delegations, but Rehfeld’s proposal for nationwide nonterritorial districts would require a constitutional amendment.
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vancement and protection of local and regional
interests. This may not be a very elevating view
of politics, and it may not be in some abstract
sense the best view, but it seems to be, to some
degree, our view, at least insofar as it is backed
by and entrenched within constitutionalized
norms.
Finally, there is the question of whether the
norm of cosmopolitan national citizenship toward which Rehfeld gestures is truly desirable
or, within the institutional structure he posits,
even humanly possible. As Benedict Anderson
has persuasively shown, we should never underestimate the power of human beings to
imagine themselves members of communities,
even very large ones.15 Yet in Anderson’s account, membership in a shared community
generally requires a plausible account—also
imagined if necessary—of how membership
was acquired and maintained, a set of customs
and traditions by which community members
must abide, perhaps even an account of a
shared, communal telos—in short, a working
narrative history.
Can Americans, embedded in a complex,
multi-layered structure of competing governmental power centers and a pluralistic politics
dominated by contending private interest
groups and associations give a plausible account of themselves as national citizens that
would permit them to imagine themselves,
upon being assigned to one of Rehfeld’s
randomized, non-territorial election districts,
members of a meaningful political community?
Would they know how to act, and would they
understand the proper motivations and behavior of members of such a district community to
be the ones Rehfeld assumes? Perhaps. Still, in
contemplating these questions we might do
well to heed Alasdair MacIntyre’s injunction to
remember that “all morality is always to some
degree tied to the socially local and particular
and that the aspirations of the morality of
modernity to a universality freed from all particularity is an illusion.” Such freedom, MacIntyre warns, is “more like the freedom of
ghosts—of those whose human substance approached vanishing point—than of men.”16
I wonder therefore whether the denizens of
Rehfeld’s randomized, nonterritorial election
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districts—those completely adventitious groupings of strangers who together inhabit no particular place and who share no human bond or
activity other than the duty to perform a single
public act every two years—can plausibly be expected diligently to pursue some abstract notion of the national good divorced from the interests of the other, much more concrete
communities in which, for all other purposes,
they live, work, and play. Wordsworth, it is
true, “wandered lonely as a cloud/ That floats
on high o’er vales and hills,”17 but no one, I
think, would mistake the United States for a nation of Wordsworths. If anything, Americans
probably better fit—or at least long have been
thought to fit—the account given by Tocqueville:
It is difficult to draw [an American] out of
his own circle to interest him in the destiny of the state, because he does not
clearly understand what influence the
destiny of the state can have upon his own
lot. But if it be proposed to make a road
across the end of his estate, he will see at
a glance that there is a connection between
this small public affair and his greatest
private affairs; and he will discover, without its being shown to him, the close tie
which unites private to general interest.18
American political life, that is to say, may focus on the local at least as much as on the national; in many ways and for many purposes it
is a politics of roadways and fence posts rather
than one of lofty principle and abstract reasoning. Rehfeld works hard to deflect the
charge that his ideal is utopian on account of

15

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (rev. ed.)
(New York: Verso, 1991).
16 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (2d ed.) (Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 126–27.
17 William Wordsworth, “I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud,”
in William Wordsworth, Selected Poems and Prefaces,
Jack Stillinger, ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 191.
18 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, excerpted in Michael McGiffert, ed., The Character of Americans (rev. ed.) (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1970),
50.
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the difficulties associated with conducting electoral politics almost solely through electronic
communications over the internet, but in the
end, the real utopianism of his baseline ideal
may be in the capacity it presupposes among
citizens to conceive of themselves as citizens of
an American nation that is somehow distinct
from its concretely local manifestations.
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